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CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A SOFT PLACE:
REGULATING LEGAL ETHICS TO POLICE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
HONG KONG
Susan E. Carrollt
Abstract. Both the United States and Hong Kong have suffered through corporate
governance scandals in recent years. The two nations have tried different methods of
regulating legal ethics in order to curtail future corporate governance scandals. The
United States, via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, empowered the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") to dictate disclosure requirements to U.S. lawyers who
represent listed corporations. This mandate creates conflicts between lawyers' duty to
keep clients' secrets and their duty to disclose client information for the protection of
public interests. Hong Kong took a completely different approach. The Hong Kong
Stock Exchange negotiated the Memorandum of Understanding with the Hong Kong Law
Society, which clarifies the scope of a solicitor's duties when practicing before the Stock
Exchange. This Comment compares the United States and Hong Kong systems of
regulating lawyers, specifically considering issues relating to corporate governance. It
concludes that the SEC should adopt Hong Kong's style of negotiation and clarification
and Hong Kong should adopt the U.S. enforcement stance and definition of the client in
order to more effectively prevent corporate scandals before they start.
I. INTRODUCTION
Both the United States and Hong Kong have had serious, market-
crippling corporate governance scandals in the last few years. In the United
States, Enron's collapse involved a $700 milliont loss of net earnings, $1.2
billion loss of shareholder equity, and the discovery of more than $4 billion
in hidden liabilities. 2 In WorldCom's downfall, 7,500 people lost their jobs3
and investors are eventually expected to lose over $175 billion4 after the
t The author would like to thank Justice Mary E. Fairhurst of the Washington State Supreme Court
for demonstrating how legal ethics regulation impacts societies, Professor Richard 0. Kummert for advice
and instruction on corporate governance and business law, Professor Scan O'Connor for advice on
securities regulation, and the members of the Washington State Bar Association's Ethics 2003 Committee
for sharing their conscientious and thorough analysis of ethics rules. All errors are the author's own.
All dollar amounts in this Comment are in U.S. dollars.
2 William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275, 1282
(2002). Enron illegitimately drove up its profits by selling and buying from its own hedge funds. Id.
3 Bloomberg News, MCI Posts Loss; Will Cut 7,500 Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at C7.
4 Seth Schiesel, No Shortage of Opinions on Salvaging WorldCom, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at
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bankruptcy and bond issues are finally adjudicated.5 While Hong Kong has
not suffered similar cataclysmic collapses, Hong Kong markets and
investors consistently suffer through corporate malfeasance such as BOTO
6
and, comparable to Enron and WorldCom, smaller corporate collapses such
as Akai Holdings.7 These scandals were particularly harmful to Hong Kong
markets because forty percent of its 6.8 million residents are retail investors
who suffered significant losses when these companies lost value.
8
In their efforts to stave off future corporate governance scandals, both
the United States and Hong Kong have focused in part on the role of
lawyers, or solicitors, as they are known in Hong Kong. 9 The regulation of
lawyers presents a novel avenue for policing corporate governance.
Lawyers are involved in virtually every fraudulent transaction, yet due to the
duty to preserve a client's confidences, 10 lawyers' actions have not
previously been questioned.
In 2002, just three weeks after WorldCom declared bankruptcy," the
U.S. Congress passed a package of major corporate governance reforms,
commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 12 Among other changes, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to regulate the lawyers representing
regulated corporations.' 3 This led to a rule allowing attorneys to withdraw
5 See, Michael Shroeder, SEC Files Civil Suit Against WorldCom, WALL ST. J, June 27, 2002, at
A3. WorldCom grossly overstated earnings for multiple cycles. Id.
6 See, e.g., Governance Offers Poor View, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 4, 2002, at 12. BOTO
sold off its most profitable division at a loss to a private company owned by the CEO and used the money
to purchase a failing company from another board member. Samuel Yeung, Boto Failed to Disclose
Connected Transactions, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 19, 2002, at 2.
7 See, e.g., Matthew Miller, Mark L. Clifford & Susan Zegel, Dishonored Dealmaker, Bus. WK.
ONLINE, Aug. 5, 2002 [hereinafter Dishonored Dealmaker]; Justice Denied in Hong Kong (Akai Holdings
Ltd.), Bus. WK., Aug. 5, 2002, at 80. The Akai founder liquidated the corporation's assets and
disappeared, probably to mainland China. Id.
Joel Baglole, Lowering the Bar. Hong Kong Has Missed an Opportunity to Raise its Market-
Regulatory Standards to Meet Global Best Practice; While Investment Banks, Brokers and Companies
Might Benefit in the Short Run as a Result, Both Investors and the City's Reputation Could Suffer
Irreparable Damage, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 15, 2004, at 38.
9 PETER WESLEY-SMITH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HONG KONG LEGAL SYSTEM 91, 93 (1987).
Hong Kong also has barristers, who are professional litigators. Id. This Comment focuses only on
solicitors, who do the majority of work on corporate governance issues in Hong Kong, though barristers
representing corporations in litigation will have similar ethics issues.
10 For U.S. lawyers, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6; for Hong Kong Solicitors, see
GUIDE FOR PROF'L CONDUCT ch. 8.
1 Richard Simon, Senate Panel Approves Reforms for Corporations Finance. Stalled Bill Gains
New Urgency. It Includes Limits on Loans to Executives and Guards on Retirement Funds, L.A. TIMES,
July 12, 2002, at A20.
12 The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley
Act), Pub.L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was codified as various entries in
the U.S.C.: 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-02, 7211-19, 7231-34, 7241-46, 2761-66, 78o-6, 78o-3, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348-
50, 1514A, 1519, 1520.
13 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
VOL. 14 No. I
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL ETHICS
from representation and reveal client confidences, a so-called "noisy
withdrawal," if the client is engaging in a qualifying fraud.
14
Hong Kong started well in advance of the United States in regulating
solicitors' actions in the corporate arena. In 1996, the Law Society of Hong
Kong and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange negotiated a Memorandum of
Understanding ("MOU"). 15 The MOU defines the expectations the Stock
Exchange has for a Hong Kong solicitor representing a listed corporation
and clearly defines a solicitor's duties when representing a listed company.16
Hong Kong was also struck by recent corporate scandals and, like the United
States, is working on new regulations to control corporate governance
scandals. On January 20, 2004,17 Hong Kong's Standing Committee on
Company Law Reform released Phase II of its report on changes needed to
Hong Kong laws to solve its corporate governance issues.'
8
In both countries, these new regulations are having unintended
consequences. In the United States, three major problems have resulted.
The first problem is that lawyers are now allowed to reveal previously
protected client confidences.' 9 Second, since state bar associations license
lawyers to practice, some lawyers are trapped because their state disclosure
rules now conflict with the SEC's disclosure rules.20 Third, because states
and the state supreme courts have traditionally regulated lawyers, the new
federal regulations evoke federalism and preemption concerns. 2'
Because the MOU envisions cooperation between the regulating
entities, Hong Kong would seem to have started off in a better position than
the United States. Hong Kong, however, faces four serious issues. First, the
14 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
's GUIDE TO PROF'L CONDUCT, ch. 15: Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between the Law
Society of Hong Kong and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (Dec. 18, 1996), available at
http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pub_e/professionalguide/chl5/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter MOU].
16 id.
'" Press Release, Standing Committee on Company Law Reform, SCCLR Issues Final
Recommendations from Corporate Governance Review Phase II (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/cr/message/040120.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
18 STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW REFORM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW - A
CONSULTATION PAPER ON PROPOSALS MADE IN PHASE II OF THE REVIEW (June 2003), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/cr/download/scclr/cgr2_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter PHASE II
REPORT]. Phase I of the report was released in July 2001. STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW
REFORM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW - A CONSULTATION PAPER ON PROPOSALS MADE IN PHASE I
OF THE REVIEW (July 2001), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/cr/download/scclr/Rpt e.pdf (last visited
Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter PHASE I REPORT].
" 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
20 For examples, see discussion infra Part II.C.4.
2' There are also issues with the separation of powers, as the SEC is part of the federal executive
branch while the state bar associations are parts of the state judicial branches and answer to the state
supreme courts. However, these issues are outside the scope of this Comment.
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MOU has never been used to discipline a solicitor, even though the recent
scandals should have produced numerous opportunities to do so. 22 Second,
Hong Kong investors have far fewer protections than U.S. investors. 23 Like
most Asian markets and unlike most U.S. corporations, Hong Kong
companies are typically family-owned or closely-held, which creates a
treacherous investment environment for minority shareholders. 24  Thirdly,
the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC") does not
investigate and pursue violating companies in the same way as the SEC. 5
The SFC reviews company documents before they are released, which
changes the character of the SFC from enforcement to auditing.2 6 Finally,
unlike U.S. lawyers, who have the Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13
to define their duties to corporate clients,27 Hong Kong solicitors who
represent corporations have no such rule defining their duties.28  The
professional rules of the Hong Kong Law Society do not clearly differentiate
who the client is and to whom the solicitor owes the duty of confidentiality.29
Both the United States and Hong Kong should learn from each other's
regulatory activities. Each country has tried distinctly different approaches
to policing corporate governance by regulating legal professionals. In the
United States, improving cooperation between regulating entities and
clarifying lawyers' obligations under both federal and state rules similar to
what Hong Kong has done with the MOU could strengthen the SEC
regulations. Hong Kong would be aided by a change in the tenor and timing
of enforcement of existing regulations, as well as by a clear definition of the
client for solicitors representing corporations.
This Comment examines and compares the two different methods of
regulating lawyers in order to prevent corporate governance scandals. Part
II discusses the corporate governance problems facing the two markets and
22 From the Council Table: MOU with the Stock Exchange, H.K. LAW., March 2004, available at
http://www.hk-lawyer.com/2004-3/Default.htm (under "Law Society News") (last visited Jan. 14, 2005)
[hereinafter From the Council Table 1].
2 Say H. Goo & Rolf H. Weber, The Expropriation Game: Minority Shareholders' Protection, 33
H.K. L. J. 71, 84-87, 93-97 (2003) [hereinafter The Expropriation Game].
24 Id. at 71.
25 SFC, THE SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION OF HONG KONG: WHOM AND How WE
REGULATE (Oct. 10, 2004), at http://www.hksfc.org.hk/eng/bills/html/index/index0.html (last visited Jan.
14, 2005).
26 SFC, INTRODUCING THE SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION OF HONG KONG, (Dec. 7, 2004),
at http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/html/EN/aboutsfc/intro/intro.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). See also HONG
KONG STOCK EXCHANGE, INTRODUCTION TO REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (Mar. 28, 2004), at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/rulereg/introreg/introreg.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
27 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
2 See infra Part III.C.2.
29 Id.
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how regulating lawyers could have prevented or mitigated past scandals.
Part III reviews the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the legal
profession's reaction to Sarbanes-Oxley, and the effectiveness of Sarbanes-
Oxley regulation of lawyers. Part IV examines Hong Kong's negotiated
system of regulating lawyers and the creation of the MOU, as well as the
MOU's effectiveness in light of Hong Kong corporate governance issues.
Part V compares the two systems, demonstrating how each system would
benefit from the other's methods. Finally this Comment concludes by
extrapolating the potential results of these proposed policy changes.
II. THE UNITED STATES ArrEMPTS TO CURE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ISSUES BY REGULATING LAWYERS
Following the collapse of major U.S. corporations, the corporate
governance system in the United States was overhauled by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. A key component of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the
regulation of lawyers.3 0 Regulating lawyers is a novel and controversial step
in corporate governance regulation for the United States. Legal ethics in the
United States have always been the purview of the individual state bar
associations and state supreme courts.3' It is not yet clear whether a lawyer
following the rules derived by the SEC in accordance with the Sarbanes-
Oxley disclosure rules will be in violation of a state's rules of conduct for
32lawyers. Even though the American Bar Association ("ABA") has adopted
similar Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") as the SEC,
the individual states continue to debate whether the SEC rules are in conflict
with or trump state rules. Regardless of the debate and the permissive nature
of the rules, the recent example of TV Azteca demonstrates the possible
effectiveness of the new rules.
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Is Enacted to Try to Solve Corporate
Governance Problems
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not invent the idea of using lawyers to
regulate corporate governance. The ABA first approached using lawyers to
address corporate governance issues when the Ethics 2000 Commission,
30 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
31 The notable exception is practicing before the patent bar. This exception to state's rights was
upheld in Sperry v. State of Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
32 See, e.g., Open Memorandum from the California Bar Association's Business Law Section
Corporations Committee, in response to the SEC's public letter to the Washington State Bar Association
(July 23, 2003) (on file with author).
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chaired by Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey,33
recommended rules allowing lawyers to report up the ladder 34 and then
noisily withdraw35 if needed.36 The ABA House of Delegates rejected this
recommendation in August 2001. During the Congressional debates in
July 2002 on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Senator John Edwards commented:
This amendment is about making sure... lawyers... don't
violate the law and... ensure that the law is being followed.
Unfortunately, the actions of some attorneys have drawn
increasing scrutiny and criticism in light of recent events
demonstrating that at least some lawyers have forgotten their
responsibility.
38
Senator Edwards added an amendment to regulate lawyers, ordering the SEC
to draft rules that allow lawyers to report up the ladder. 39 The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act40 worked its way through Congress during the inquiries following
the Enron collapse, but stalled until WorldCom declared bankruptcy.4' It
was passed three weeks later42 and became effective as of August 2002.
" Chief Justice Veasey heads the Supreme Court of Delaware, which is the U.S. state most
associated with corporate laws. For more on Delaware's primacy on corporate laws, see, e.g., Albert
Crenshaw, Delaware Inc., WASH. POST, May 7, 2000, at HI; Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of
State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).34 "Up the ladder" is a process where a lawyer or law firm, after discovering credible evidence of a
material violation, reports the violation first to the corporation's managers, then to the executives, and
finally to the board of directors. For an excellent explanation of the process, see Karl A. Groskaufmanis,
Climbing "Up the Ladder": Corporate Counsel and the SEC's Reporting Requirement for Lawyers, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 511, 518-19 (Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Climbing Up the Ladder].
35 "Noisy withdrawal" is a process whereby a lawyer or law firm, after exhausting the remedies
available by reporting up the ladder, withdraws from representing the corporation, notifies the SEC of their
withdrawal, and disaffirms any previous SEC filings made for that corporation that the lawyer or law firm
believes to be materially false or misleading. Id. at 519-520.
36 E. Norman Veasey, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the Ethics 2000
Recommendations, Congressional Activity and Concerns Over Federalism, THE BENCHER, Nov./Dec.
2002, at 15-18.
'7 Information about the House of Delegate's amendments to the Ethics 2000 Commission's
recommendations in August 2001 is available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-summary_2002.htnd (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005).
'8 See 148 CONG. REC. S6524 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Senator John Edwards).
39 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
40 The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley
Act), Pub.L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
41 See Tom Hamburger, Greg Hitt & Michael Schroeder, Sony, Wrong Number: WorldCom Case
Boosts Congress in Reform Efforts, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A8.
42 id.
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act added various internal checks-and-balances
to the tracking of a listed corporation's finances.43 These included
substantial additions to the duty of care for the Chief Executive Officer
("CEO"), 44 Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), 45 and other Senior Finance
Officers,46 as well as requiring CEOs and CFOs to personally sign-off on
public financial statements and enacting individual penalties when these
financial reports are amended.47 It also included requirements for outside
auditing committees48 and extensive changes to accounting standards and
accountability.
49
For the first time, however, Sarbanes-Oxley combined securities
regulation and corporate governance requirements with the regulation of a
lawyer's ethical duties. Sarbanes-Oxley section 307 ordered the SEC to
begin regulating lawyers by promulgating a new rule:
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the
equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to
the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial
measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring
the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the
board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the
board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed
directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.5 0
If a lawyer finds an irregularity, the lawyer can notify the corporation's
officers up the chain of command as high as the chief executive officer or
the board of directors.51 These types of inter-organizational notifications are
not considered a breach of the attorney-client confidentiality or a conflict of
interest because the organization is the client, not the wrong-doing officer or
4' 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7211, 7213, 7241, 7242, 7261, 7265; 18 U.S.C § 1350 (2002).
44 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002).
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 7264, 18 U.S.C. 1350 (2002).
46 id.
47 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002).
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7211, 7213, 7241, 7242 (2002).
4' Id. §§ 7213, 7218.
so Id. § 7245.
51 Id.
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board member.52 If the chief corporate officers and non-independent board
members do not respond by fixing the problem, the lawyer is then authorized
to notify the newly required external audit committees.5 3
The SEC took Sarbanes-Oxley a step farther, however, when it drafted
the required rule. If the issue is not sufficiently resolved internally, and if
the fraudulent actions will cause significant financial or property harm to a
third party, and the lawyer's services were used in perpetrating the fraud,
then, and only then, the lawyer may instigate a noisy withdrawal.54 In a
noisy withdrawal the lawyer or law firm announces to the board that they are
no longer representing the firm, notify the SEC of this action within one day,
and, finally, disaffirm any SEC filings that the law firm now believes are
suspect, effectively revealing the client's confidences.
5
B. The American Bar Association Opts for Unity with the SEC in the
Revised Model Rules of Professional Conduct
U.S. lawyers are licensed to practice in each individual state, not in
the nation as a whole. Each state has its own bar association that maintains
its own rules regulating lawyer conduct. The ABA is a national organization
in which lawyers participate voluntarily. 6  The ABA does not actually
regulate lawyers, but influences the growth and standards of the legal
profession in the United States.57 The ABA first drafted a Model Code of
Professional Conduct as a suggestion to the state bar associations as to what
their state codes should be.5 8  The ABA replaced the Model Code of
Professional Conduct with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules") in 1983. 59  The Model Rules, like the Model Code of
Professional Conduct, were not binding on any lawyer in any state. Many
state bar associations also switched from the Model Code of Professional
52 id.
53 id.
' 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
55 Id.
56 "The ABA is a voluntary national professional association with no legal authority to adjudicate or
intervene in lawyer licensing or disciplinary matters. To file a complaint against a lawyer, contact the
appropriate state agency for assistance." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/publicinfo.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
57 Id.
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble, available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/mcpr.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
59 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ADOPTION HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mspc/mrpchome.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
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Conduct to the Model Rules. Some did not switch and still operate under
their version of the Model Code of Professional Conduct.
60
The Model Rules were extensively revised in 2000 by the ABA's
Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
("Ethics 2000").61  Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice E. Norman
Veasey chaired the Ethics 2000 Commission, which is significant because
the State of Delaware is renowned for its corporate laws.62 The Ethics 2000
Commission proposal contained, among many other changes, revisions to
two key rules: Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality) 63 and Model Rule 1.13
(Organization as a Client). 64 The proposed changes were very similar to the
language eventually used in Sarbanes-Oxley and in the resulting SEC
regulations. The ABA House of Delegates initially rejected the Ethics 2000
recommendations on Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13,65 but after the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley and the implementation of the SEC regulations in 2002, the
ABA House of Delegates and membership adopted the Ethics 200066
Commission's recommendation on August 6, 2003.
The state bar associations, triggered by the Ethics 2000 Commission's
revision of the Model Rules, are currently in different stages of reviewing
their own Rules of Professional Conduct. 67 While there is a strong push for
national uniformity, federalism concerns continue to block standardization of
state legal ethics.
60 Most notably New York still uses the Code of Professional Conduct system. See New York
Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, available at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/AttomeyResources/LawyersCode-of ProfessionalRes
ponsibility/LawyersCodeOfProfessionalResponsibility.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). Some other states
have not been guided by the ABA at all. California's rules are not modeled on any ABA suggestions. See







20Conduct (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
61 Information on the Ethics 2000 Commission, its work, and its report is available at
http://www.abanet.org/epr/ethics2k.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
62 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 33; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 33.
63 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).
6 Id. R. 1.13.
65 Information about the House of Delegate's amendments to the Ethics 2000 Commission's
recommendations in August 2001 is available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-sunumary_2002.html (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005).
66 Press Release, ABA Adopts New Lawyer Ethics Rules, Urges Fairness in Military Commission
Trials, Policies Also Address USA PATRIOT Act, Funding for First Responders to Terrorism (Aug. 12,
2003), available at http://www.abanews.org/aug03/081203_1.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
67 Progress on the adoption is available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.htn-d (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005). Note that the chart only indicates where the states are in the process of review, it
does not note whether the states chose to adopt the ABA Model Rule language.
65 Robert A. Creamer, Form over Federalism: The Case for Consistency in State Ethics Rules
Formats, PROF. LAW., Spring 2002, available at http://www.abanet.org/epr/e2k/conventions2.pdf (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005). See infra Part II.C.3 for further discussion of federalism conflicts.
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1. Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality)
Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality) governs lawyers whether the client
is an individual or a corporation. For either type of client, a lawyer may
only divulge client confidences in defined exceptional circumstances. All
these exceptions are permissive, including when the lawyer is acting to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.69
The key provisions for corporate governance are Model Rule
1.6(b)(2), (3), and (6). Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) allows a lawyer to disclose
confidences to prevent clients from using the lawyer's services in
furtherance of a fraud.70 Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) allows the lawyer to disclose
client confidences to rectify, mitigate, or prevent the fraud in furtherance of
which the client used the lawyer's services. 71 Under these two rules the
lawyer can only disclose if the client abused the attorney-client relationship.
If the lawyer is hired to defend against the fraud claim or if the client did not
use the lawyer's services to perpetrate the fraud, according to Model Rule
1.6(a), the lawyer may not disclose the fraud.72
Finally, Model Rule 1.6(b)(6) allows "other law" to regulate a
lawyer's conduct.73 This highly debated language 74 allows regulations like
Sarbanes-Oxley and agencies like the SEC to regulate lawyer conduct, even
though this task was previously delegated only to the state bar associations.75
2. Model Rule 1.13 (Organization as a Client)
Model Rule 1.13 (Organization as Client) is crucial to lawyers
representing corporations.76 Model Rule 1.13 specifies that the lawyer
represents the organization, not its officers, employees, or other persons
69 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6.
70 Id. R. 1.6(b)(2).
71 Id. R. 1.6(b)(3).72 Id. R. 1.6(b)(2), (3).
71 Id. R. 1.6(b)(6).
74 For an extensive discussion of the "other law" language issues, see Minutes from the January 31,
2004, WSBA Ethics 2003 Committee; Presentation of Professor Thomas R. Andrews, Professor of Law at
the University of Washington, available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/appendixe.doc
(last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
75 Patent law is the notable exception to the state's power to regulate lawyers. See Sperry v. State of
Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
76 Chief Justice Veasey wrote, "A proper reading of Model Rule 1.13 makes it clear that in the
serious corporate fraud case the lawyer must act promptly to prevent the fraud by going up the chain of
command to the board of directors if necessary. In most instances the lawyer representing the corporation
who successfully goes up the Rule 1.13 chain of command and stops the malfeasance, or whose 'noisy
withdrawal' permitted by Rules 1.6 and 1.13 sends up red flags for the world to see, will have avoided the
need to disclose his client's confidences outside the organization." Veasey, supra note 36, at 16.
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associated with the organization.77  If the lawyer knows that one of these
individuals is acting or intends to act in a way that violates the law or a legal
obligation, then the lawyer can notify other members of the corporation,
including the highest members.78 If the highest members of the corporation
do not respond in a timely or appropriate manner, then the lawyer can reveal
client confidences only to the extent needed to prevent substantial injury to
the corporation. 79 If the lawyer was fired for reporting up the ladder, the
lawyer may continue to represent the corporation by notifying the highest
members of the corporation of the fraud committed by the 
underlings.80
C. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Revised Model Rules Cause Conflict
and Confusion
Sarbanes-Oxley has left both lawyers and corporations confused.
Corporations and lawyers are trying to cope with the new strict requirements
for outside boards, independent auditors, and greater CEO and CFO
involvement.8' Corporations are being driven out of the market.
8 2  SEC
enforcements are much harsher and harder to predict under the 
new rules.8 3
Lawyers find themselves in a profoundly conflicted position. They
must now choose whether to reveal client confidences and, regardless of
their choice, may be disciplined because the new SEC rules and the rules of
professional conduct of the state in which they practice may disagree. State
bar associations are bristling as the SEC attempts to regulate lawyers and the
SEC is taking a heavy-handed approach to the state bar associations.
8 4
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 3(a)-(b).
7 Id. R. 1.13(b).
79 Id. R. 1. 13 (c).
"o Id. R. 1. 13(e).
8I The 2004 Annual Meeting of the ABA's Business Law Section included seminars entitled "The
Evolving Relationship with Auditors in the New Corporate Environment: Trusted Advisors or Foes?",
"Lawyers Caught in the Enron Spotlight," "What's So Hot About Going Private? Nuts and Bolts of Taking
a Public Company Private," "Enron's Lessons for Investment Bankers, Accountants, Attorneys and Other
Advisers," "Components of Effective Ethics Training for Corporate Compliance," and "Wanted: Corporate
Directors Who Are Not Afraid to Face Millions of Dollars of Personal Liability Since We Cannot Afford
D&O Insurance." American Bar Association, Business Law Spring 2004 Conference Course Listings (on
file with author).
82 See, e.g., Jeremy Khan, The Burden of Being Public; Bound By New Regulations and Changes on
Wall Street, More Firms Are Breaking Free-By Going Private, FORTUNE, May 26, 2003, at 35.
83 Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Feels Pressure to Weaken Some Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2004, at C1.
84 See infra Part II.C.4.
JANUARY 2005
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
1. Confusion for Corporations and Lawyers About Corporate
Governance and the New Expenses ofBeing a Listed Corporation
Compliance with the rules in Sarbanes-Oxley is expensive and
resource consuming for both corporations and lawyers. A recent trend
among small to medium sized businesses is "going private," or applying for
delisting. 85  This complex process often involves buying out minority
shareholders at a premium, but the costs of the buyout can be much cheaper
than the costs of complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements. 6
There is also a limited number of persons willing to be independent
auditors. Professionals who may qualify as independent auditors for a
corporation are declining because of rising liability insurance costs or
because of higher sensitivity to possible conflicts of interest.87  These
professionals are now requiring higher compensation commensurate with the
greater personal risk and responsibility.88 Again, this prices many smaller
and mid-sized companies out of the possibility of compliance.
For lawyers, the risks of representing corporations under the new
disclosure requirements have increased. Mark A. Belnick, the lawyer for
Tyco Corporation, was sued by the SEC for his actions related to the
corporate governance abuses at TYCO and the SEC investigation of TYCO
CEO Dennis Koslowski. 89 Belnick was acquitted by a jury, but only after a
long and costly litigation.90 The lawyers in the TV Azteca case are not being
85 See, e.g., Carrie Coolidge, Who Needs The Aggravation?; With Stricter Federal Accounting Laws,
Microcaps Eye Going Private, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 56; Robert Clow, Groups May Delist to Avoid
Tougher SEC Rules, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002, at P30; Laura K. Thompson, A (Going) Private Matter-
Why More Public Firms Should Consider Delisting, ECONOMIST, March 22, 2003; Andrew Dolbeck, New
Accounting Rules Drive Privatization Deals, WKLY. CORP. GROWTH REP., Apr. 21, 2003, at I; Tim Reason,
Off the Street: Stricter Rules and Wary Investors are Prompting More Companies to Exit the Public
Markets, CFO, May 1, 2003, at 54; Deborah Lohse, Struggling Firms Decide to Go Private, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, May 8, 2003, at 12; Mark Cecil, Sarbanes-Oxley Propels More Small Companies To Go
Private, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS REP., May 19, 2003; Khan, supra note 82; Josh Friedman, More
Companies Find It's Better to Go Private, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at C1.
86 For an example of a company that went private, see the Cobalt Group privatization. Press
Release, The Cobalt Group, Inc. Announces Completion of Going-private Transaction (Nov. 13, 2001),
available at http://www.cobaltgroup.com/press/pr/pressrelease-01 11 13.jsp (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
87 Thompson, supra note 85.
'8 Richard H. Guifford & Harry Howe, Regulation and Unintended Consequences: Thoughts on
Sarbanes-Oxley, CPA J. ONLINE (June 4, 2004), at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2004/604/perspectives/p6.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
89 Laurie P. Cohen, Tyco's Former Top Lawyer Joins CEO on Hot Seat, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002,
at C1.
90 Jonathan D. Glater, Jury Finds Ex-Tyco Lawyer Not Guilty of All Charges, N.Y. Times, July 16,
2004 at Cl.
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sued by the SEC; instead they are being sued by their former client for
disclosing that client's alleged misconduct to the SEC. 9'
2. The SEC Heightens Corporations' and Lawyers' Fears by Taking a
Strong Enforcement Stance
The SEC's enforcement stance since Sarbanes-Oxley has greatly
increased the risks to both corporations and their lawyers for any kind of
non-compliance. Empowered by the congressional backing implicit in the
passage of such a far-reaching bill as Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC has become
much more aggressive in going after companies and much less forgiving in
sanctions. 92 In June 2001, just a month pre-Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC fined
Arthur Andersen a record $7 million for accounting fraud.93 Post-Sarbanes-
Oxley, the SEC has imposed penalties ranging from $10 million against
Xerox94 to $50 million against Vivendi,95 to $750 million against
WorldCom.96 These judgments also come on top of sizeable disgorgements
by both the corporations and the individual officers.
97
For lawyers, monetary and criminal penalties from SEC actions are
not the only consequences. A lawyer may also be sanctioned by the state bar
association, which may include disbarment. These career-limiting or career-
ending sanctions would be in addition to any SEC criminal charges or
financial penalties. Lawyers caught in the SEC's aggressive enforcement
practices may have to choose between their freedom or their career.
3. Client Confidentiality Under Attack
Client confidentiality is the foundation of any attorney-client
relationship.98  The new SEC rules and ABA Revised Model Rules are
chipping away at the protection of client confidences. According to Sandra
9' See infra Part II.D (Case Study: TV Azteca).92 Climbing Up the Ladder, supra note 34, at 522.
93 Michael Schroeder, SEC Fines Arthur Andersen in Fraud Case: Big 5 Firm to Pay $7 Million
After Inquiry ofAudits For Waste Management, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2001, at A3. While the SEC fines in
the 1980's against Michael Milken totaling $447 million and his former employer, Drexel Burnham
Lambert, for $350 million were record setters, they were also anomalies. The judgment against Arthur
Andersen was not seen as a similar outlier, but as a record-setting fine. Id.
94 SEC v. Xerox Corporation, Litigation Release No. 17465, Release No. AE - 1542, 77 S.E.C.
Docket 971, 2002 WL 535379 (S.E.C. Release No.) (Apr. 11, 2002).
15 SEC v. Vivendi, Litigation Release No. 18523, Release No. AE - 1935, 81 S.E.C. Docket 3043,
2003 WL 23013258 (S.E.C. Release No.) (Dec. 24, 2003).
96 SEC v. WorldCom, Litigation Release No. 17866, Release No. AE - 1678, 2002 WL 31662699
(S.E.C. Release No.) (Nov. 26, 2002).
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 7246, 77t(d)(3)(A) (2002).
9' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 2 (2003).
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J. Harris, Director of the Pacific Regional Office of the SEC, the SEC values
cooperation by the embattled corporation more than anything else in making
prosecution decisions. 99  Cooperation with the SEC affects the SEC's
charging decisions, remedies sought, and criminal charges leveled. 00 Ms.
Harris cited the HomeStore case, 1 1 in which the company immediately
notified the SEC of possible wrongdoing, did an independent and thorough
audit, gave the audit results to the SEC, waived attorney-client privilege,
fired the wrongdoers, and added new controls to prevent future similar
abuses. 10 2 Due to the company's swift and extensive actions, the SEC did
not prosecute the company as a whole, even though eleven individuals were
criminally charged. 0 3 If waiving attorney-client privilege is what the SEC
means by "cooperation," then lawyers throughout the United States should
be concerned about any attack by the SEC on confidentiality. If every
company were as cooperative as HomeStore, the SEC would be obsolete.
U.S. lawyers no longer know to what extent their representation of
their client corporations is protected. The language "rectify, mitigate, and
prevent"' 4 from the ABA Model Rules is particularly concerning as there
are no guidelines as to what actions rectify, to what extent must they
mitigate, or what prevention measures are required. 0 5 To effectively have
attorneys aid in controlling corporate governance abuses, the rules need to
be clear and the duties non-conflicting. This will not happen until the SEC
and the state bar associations negotiate effectively with each other.
4. Conflict of Rules between the SEC and State Bar Associations
The new rules regulating lawyers has caused controversy in the U.S.
legal profession. State bar associations argue that pre-emption and
federalism prevent the SEC from regulating a lawyer's conduct.' 6 In the
99 Ms. Harris's comments were made at a seminar entitled "A Business Lawyer's Primer on Hot
Topics in SEC Enforcement," presented jointly by the ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities
and the ABA Committee on State Regulation of Securities, Apr. 1, 2004, at the ABA Business Law Section
Annual Conference. This report is available for ABA members at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/mo/preium-cl/programs/sprO4/17/17.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) (on
file with the author).
100 Id.
'0' SEC v. Sophia M Kabler, Litigation Release No. 18355, Release No. AE - 1864, 81 S.E.C.
Docket 367, 2003 WL 23305808 (S.E.C. Release No.) (Sept. 18. 2003).
102 See Harris, supra note 99.
1o3 SEC v. Gieseck, Litigation Release No. 17745, Release No. AE - 1636, 78 S.E.C. Docket 1494,
2002 WL 31121375 (S.E.C. Release No.) (Sept. 25, 2002).
'04 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6).
105 Id.
'06 Letter from the California Bar Assn's Bus. L. Sec. Corp. Committee, to Giovanni P. Prezioso,
General Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (August 13, 2003) (on file with author). See
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Congressional debate over the amendment adding lawyer accountability to
the Sarbanes-Oxley bill, Senator Michael Enzi said:
I am usually in the camp that believes that [s]tates should
regulate professionals within their jurisdiction. However, in
this case, the [s]tate bars as a whole have failed. They have
provided no specific ethical rule of conduct to remedy this kind




As a result of ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission's work, most state bar
associations are in the process of reviewing their ethics rules and many are
choosing either not to accept the revised disclosure rules or to adopt a further
revised version. 0 8 The Washington State Bar Association issued an Interim
Formal Ethics Opinion stating that lawyers would be held to the state bar
disclosure rules and not the SEC rules, therefore prohibiting lawyers from
noisily withdrawing while ensuring the protection of client confidences. 0 9
The SEC responded in an open letter stating that any lawyer practicing
before the SEC would be subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley rules regardless of
state bar sanctions and that federal regulations trump state bar rules." 0 The
Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section of the California Bar
Association responded to the SEC's public letter with an open letter
supporting Washington's Interim Formal Ethics Opinion."' The Washington
State Bar Association also responded, requesting a compromise with the
SEC: "[the Washington State Bar Association] trust[s] that the
harmonization of the SEC's permissive disclosure rule with adherence to the
Washington Rules of Professional Conduct. . . best meets our respective
also Committee of the Bus. L. Sec. and Committee on Prof. Responsibility and Conduct, Ethics Alert: The
New SEC Attorney Conduct Rules v. California 's Duty of Confidentiality Corporations [hereinafter Ethics
Alert], available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/SEC-ethics-alert.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
g0 148 CONG. REC. at S6524 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statements by Senator Michael Enzi).
1' Most notably California and Washington. The California Bar Association issued an Ethics Alert
about the SEC rules. See Ethics Alert supra, note 106.
'09 Wash. State Bar Ass'n Board of Governors, Interim Formal Ethics Opinion Re: The Effect of the
SEC's Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations on Washington Attorneys' Obligations Under the RPCs (July 26,
2003), available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/formalopinion.doc (last visited Jan. 14,
2005).
" 0 Giovanni P. Prezioso, Public Statement by SEC Official: Letter Regarding Washington State Bar
Association's Proposed Opinion on the Effect of the SEC's Attorney Conduct Rules (July 23, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
"' Letter from the California Bar Association's Bus. L. Sec. Corp. Committee, to Giovanni P.
Prezioso, General Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (August 13, 2003) (on file with
author).
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goals and obligations." ' 1 2 The Washington State Bar Association's Ethics
2003 Committee, which was reviewing the revised Model Rules, final
recommendation on the Model Rules was not compliant with the SEC
rule. 113 This recommendation was accepted by the Washington State Bar
Association's Board of Governors' 14 and has been presented to the
Washington State Supreme Court. Whether the SEC chooses to litigate
against lawyers in Washington or California has yet to be seen.
5. The SEC Rule is Ineffective Because It is Not Mandatory
The permissive nature of the SEC rule and the ABA Model Rules, as
demonstrated by the language of "may" in the rules instead of "must" or
"will," significantly dilutes both rules. This benefits lawyers who want to
protect their clients' secrets. Whether to take any action, be it reporting up
the ladder, reporting out to an audit board, or noisily withdrawing, is up to
the lawyer.
Internal clauses and disclaimers also soften the rule. First, it applies
only to frauds in which the lawyer's services were used, 1 5 not frauds that
the lawyer discovers in the due course of representing the company.1 16 Also,
those frauds must be likely to cause significant financial or property harm to
a third party.' 17 If the harm is not assured, not significant, or the harm does
not affect the finances or property of a third party or the corporation itself,
the lawyer may not disclose.'s
Finally, the noisy withdrawal process is diluted as well. The lawyer or
law firm only moves on to the next level if they fail to get an "adequate
response."1, 19 "Adequate response" is never defined; it is discretionary to the
lawyer. If informing the directors and officers does not resolve the problem,
the lawyer's next recourse is to present the issue to the independent
auditors.1 20 While the auditors are independent, they have been chosen by
1'2 Letter from Richard Manning, President of the Wash. State Bar Ass'n, to Givoanni P. Prezioso,
General Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (August 11, 2003), available at
http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/manninglettertosec.doc (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
113 The Ethics 2003 Committee's final recommendations are available at
http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).








"' 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2003).
120 Id.
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the board and the same officers who did not adequately respond to the
lawyer's concerns. It is only after these onerous and time-consuming steps
that the lawyer may finally disclose confidences to the authorities, but again
only to the extent necessary to prevent the fraud. 121 Most lawyers will find a
way to silently withdraw well before this point.
D. Case Study: TVAzteca
Despite these problems, lawyers have been able to use noisy
withdrawals to expose and reduce corporate fraud, such as in the TV Azteca
case. On December 24, 2003, one of the first noisy withdrawal cases
splashed across the business pages of the New York Times. 122 On December
12, 2003, the firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld informed the TV
Azteca board of directors and federal regulators by letter that the firm was
withdrawing as counsel from a bond offering due to possible violations of
U.S. securities laws. 123 In the five weeks following the noisy withdrawal,
reporters discovered that unconventional loans were made to TV Azteca's
CEO 12 4 and the CEO had a financial interest in a transaction with a cell
phone service provider. 25 These discoveries have led to a shareholder class
action lawsuit. 126 Since the withdrawal, TV Azteca stock has plummeted.1
27
For the lawyers, this was a very risky choice. TV Azteca has retained
counsel to sue Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld for breaching client
confidences. 128  In addition, it remains to be seen whether the firm or its
lawyers will be subject to disciplinary action by the New York State Bar
Association. In this case, due to the rules of the New York Bar Association,
it is unlikely that Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld will be sanctioned.
29
21 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
122 Patrick McGeehan, Lawyers Take Suspicions on TV Azteca to Its Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2004, at Bus. 1.
123 id.
124 Anthon Harrup, TV Azteca Says Committee To Review Debt Disclosure Row, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, Jan. 7, 2004; Bloomberg News, Mexican TV Executive Under Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2004.
:25 Sweetheart Cup to be Sold, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2003, at E02.
126 See, e.g., John Hecht & Maria Matzer Rose, Unhappy New Year for TV Azteca: Shares Plunge
Over Chiefs Involvement in Controversial Debt Deal, HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 12, 2004; Bondholders File
Lawsuit Against Mexico's lusacell, Dow JONES EMERGING MARKETS REP., Jan. 14, 2004; John Authers,
Lawsuit Blow for TVAzteca, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at 24.
127 See, e.g., Mexico's TV Azteca Shares Dive On News Of Disclosure Row, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS,
Dec. 24, 2003. TVAzteca Stock Falls 9% on Allegations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2003, at C9; A T&TFreezes
Managers'Salaries in '04, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 27, 2003, at C3; Patrick McGeehan, Citing Inquiry at
TVAzteca, 3 Firms Tell Investors to Sell, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at C6.
12' TVAzteca Hires Counsel, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 8, 2004.
129 N.Y. Code ofProf'l Resp. (NY CPR) § 4-101(C) (2002). The "other law" language ofNY CPR 4-
101(C)(2) should allow the SEC rules derived from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to override confidentiality.
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When states' disclosure rules conflict with the new SEC disclosure
rules, lawyers are caught in a no man's land between disbarment and federal
charges. This is a particularly threatening place to be due to the SECs
aggressive enforcement stance. The SEC's hardball tactics with state bar
associations only exacerbates this conflict. U.S. lawyers need the state bar
associations and the SEC to cooperate and clarify the exact duties they owe
to their clients. The SEC and the state bar associations can look to Hong
Kong for an example of such cooperation.
III. HONG KONG ATTEMPTS TO CURE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES
THROUGH THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE STANDING
COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW REFORMS REPORTS
Hong Kong recognized years ago that solicitors are uniquely situated
in cases of corporate fraud and acted upon this belief long before the United
States. 130  The MOU between the Law Society and the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange is not only an excellent example of two regulatory powers
working together for mutual benefit, but it also provides clearlridance as to
a solicitor's duties when practicing before the stock exchange.
Even with the MOU, Hong Kong still suffered recent corporate
scandals.132  Similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Hong Kong's Standing
Committee on Company Law Reform ("SCCLR") was tasked with
proposing new regulations to improve corporate governance in Hong Kong.
The SCCLR released Phase I of its report and proposed regulations in July
2001.133 Phase II was released in January 2004.
Unfortunately, both of Hong Kong's attempted reforms are falling
short. The MOU has never been used in a disciplinary case.' 35 The Law
The NY CPR was last updated post-Sarbanes-Oxley effective Jan. 1, 2002. Id. Therefore it is likely that
the NY Bar anticipated lawyers complying with Sarbanes-Oxley when the NY CPR was last updated and
will likely not pursue disciplinary action against these lawyers. Regardless of the change to the NY CPR,
the N.Y. State Bar Association's Business Law Section wrote an open letter to the SEC speaking against
noisy withdrawal, saying that silent withdrawal should be sufficient. Letter from N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Bus.
L. Sec., to the SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentGroups/
NewsI/Releaseattachments/businesslawcommentsl2 1802.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). The N.Y. State
Bar Association Corporate Counsel Section wrote a supporting letter. Letter from N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
Corp. Coons. Sec., to the SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentGroups/News i/Release_attachments/reedletterl 21802.pdf (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005).
130 The MOU was effective in 1996. See MOU, supra note 15.
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., Governance Offers Poor View, supra note 6; Dishonored Dealmaker, supra note 7.
3 See PHASE I, supra note 18.
134 See SCCLR, supra note 17.
13s See From the Council Table I, supra note 22.
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Society rules regulating solicitors do not clearly define who the client is
when the solicitor is representing a corporation. 136 The SCCLR Phase I
changes have met with limited success and the Phase II changes, while it is
too soon to measure any effect, do not go far enough.
A. The Law Society of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
Negotiated the Memorandum of Understanding
Solicitors are self-regulated through the Law Society of Hong Kong
137
("Law Society"). Established in 1907, the Law Society is comparable to
U.S. state bar associations. 138 It is a professional society, a community-
relations organization, a political lobby, and a regulatory body.' 39 The Law
Society maintains the Guide to Professional Conduct ("GPC"), 140 which is
the Hong Kong counterpart to a state's rules of professional conduct.
Unlike the United States, the Law Society and the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange had the foresight to realize that solicitors would be involved in
corporate securities law violations. This led them to collaborate on a
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Law Society of Hong Kong
and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in 1996.141 The Law Society
incorporated the MOU directly into the GPC as Title 15, giving the rules in
the MOU the same power as any rule regulating solicitors.
142
In the MOU, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange agrees not to make rules
regulating, state any public findings about, impose any penalties or sanctions
on, or take any other kind of disciplinary action against a solicitor unless the
solicitor violates one of the following three rules:
(1) If a solicitor makes an untrue representation to the
Exchange: made on the instructions of his client, and
purporting to be so made, and which the solicitor knows to be
untrue or made with reckless disregard as to its truthfulness; or
made otherwise than on instructions of a client by the solicitor
136 There is no rule in the professional guide comparable to Model Rule 1.13. HONG KONG
SOLICITOR, GUIDE TO PROF'L CONDUCT, available at
http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pube/professionalguide/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
137 LAW SOCIETY OF HONG KONG, ABOUT THE LAW SOCIETY: PROFILE (2002), at
http://www.hklawsoc.org.hkpube/about/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
138 Id.
139 See Video: "The Law Society of Hong Kong," available at
http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pube/about/vcd/ChineseEnglish 128K.WMV (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
140 HONG KONG LAW SOCIETY, HONG KONG SOLICITER'S GUIDE TO PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
available at http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pub e/professionalguide/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
141 See MOU, supra note 15.
142 id.
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knowing it to be untrue or without having made reasonable
inquiries as to its truthfulness.
(2) Where a solicitor knowingly or recklessly facilitates or
participates in a breach of the Listing Rules.1
43
(3) Where acting for a client in relation to a listing matter, a
solicitor knowingly or unreasonably fails to advise his client in
relation to relevant requirements of the Listing Rules, or
incorrectly advises his client in relation to such requirements,
knowing such advice to be incorrect or with reckless disregard
as to its correctness.
144
All other disciplinary actions are reserved solely to the Law Society.145
The MOU also sets a clear pecking order for the rules. If a solicitor
refuses to answer questions on these three actions as part of a Hong Kong
Stock Exchange investigation by claiming it violates another Law Society
GPC rule, then the Stock Exchange refers the matter to the Law Society to
resolve. 146 There is nothing in the MOU that directs a solicitor to disclose
any confidential information. 147 This is important to solicitors, as it sets a
clear hierarchy of rules and definition of their duties, unlike the conflicts and
confusion experienced by U.S. lawyers.
B. SCCLR Phase I and Phase II Reports Propose Reforms to Hong Kong
Company Law
After an intense review of Hong Kong laws, the SCCLR released its
final recommendations in the Phase II Govemment Corporation Govemance
Review, which included the Committee's recommended changes to Hong
Kong's securities regulations. 48 Phase I was released three years earlier.
49
Both Phase Reports cite in their terms that the reports were instigated by
143 The MOU gives further clarification on this point in an internal note acknowledging that
"'[k]nowingly participat[ing' in a breach is a wide concept but see below the Exchange's express




147 Id. Hong Kong solicitor's duty of confidentiality is defined in Guide to Professional Conduct,
Chapter 8: Confidentiality, available at http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pub_e/professionalguide/chO8/ (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005).
141 See PHASE II REPORT, supra note 18. See also Press Release, SCCLR, SCCLR Issues Final
Recommendations from Corporate Governance Review Phase It (Jan, 20, 2004), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/genera/200401/20/0120144.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
149 See PHASE I REPORT, supra note 18. See also Press Release, SCCLR, SCCLR: Consultation on
Corporate Governance Review Phase I Proposals (July 20, 2001), available at
http://www.fstb.gov.hk/fsb/ppr/press/doc/pr2O07Ol e.doc (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
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Hong Kong's need to rein in the inequitable powers held by majority
shareholders and increase minority shareholder protections. 150 Phase II also
recognizes the need to reduce corporate scandals.151 Both Phase Reports
address similar issues and come up with many similar solutions as Sarbanes-
Oxley, including greater duties for directors, 152 officers, 53 and auditors, 54 as
well as increasing the rights of shareholders in private actions,' which are
very limited in Hong Kong.156  However, neither Phase Report addresses
regulating solicitors. The SCCLR report is poised to try to stop corporate
fraud at the beginning by affecting a director's duties, or to catch it after the
fact by regulating the accountants and auditors, but it is missing the key
piece-catching fraud as it happens-which solicitors are in a unique
position to do.
C. The MOU, the Guide for Professional Conduct, and the SCCLR Phase
I and II Reports Need To Be More Effective
These three sets of rules have not been effective in combating
corporate scandals. The MOU, for all its cooperative elegance and clarity,
has never been used. 157 The Law Society is in the process of renegotiating
the MOU in light of changes to the Securities and Futures Ordinance, but the
Law Society does not want to alter the original MOU. 58 The GPC does not
clearly define who the client is when the solicitor has a conflict of interest
between an officer or owner of a corporation and the corporate entity itself.
The SCCLR Phase I amendments have not been effective, 59 and the Phase II
recommendations do not go far enough to protect shareholders.
150 PHASE I REPORT, supra note 18, at iii; PHASE II REPORT, supra note 18, at iii.
's' See PHASE II REPORT, supra note 18.
152 Id. at 15-20, 70-81.
's Id. at 32-40.
114 Id. at 40-45, 126-139.
' Id. at 83-96. Both Phase I and II reports stated that this was one of the main impediments to
having active minority shareholders, something very desirable, because through litigation the companies
are ket honest. Id.; PHASE I REPORT, supra note 18, at 52-60.1 6 See The Expropriation Game, supra note 23.
157 See MOU, supra note 15.
'58 From the Council Table: Memorandum of Understanding with the Stock Exchange, H.K. LAW.,
July 2004, available at http://www.hk-lawyer.com/2004-8/Default.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005)
[hereinafter From the Council Table III.
159 Paul Spink & Stephen Chan, The Hong Kong Company Director's Duty of Skill and Care, 33 H.K.
L. J. 139 (2003) [hereinafter HKDirector's Duty].
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1. The MOU Has Never Been Used
Under the MOU, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange does not regulate
solicitors in the same way as the SEC is now trying to regulate lawyers. The
problem remains, however, that the MOU has not stopped solicitors from
aiding corporations in defrauding their minority shareholders, looting the
company resources, or other acts of corporate malfeasance. 160 In the eight
years of its existence, the MOU has never been used in a disciplinary
proceeding.' 6' The Law Society is currently in the process of revising the
MOU,1 62 especially in light of the transfer of some securities enforcement
powers from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to the Securities and Futures
Commission during the 2005 calendar year.1 3
The current MOU is an excellent example of cooperation of
regulatory agencies. Unfortunately, it also further limits the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange's weak enforcement powers and prevents Hong Kong from
turning to a noisy withdrawal system similar to that of the SEC. The Law
Society needs to undertake the major step of clearly defining the client, so
that solicitors can help protect the markets from corporate governance
abuses.
2. The Professional Guidelines Do Not Define the Corporate Entity as
the Client
Hong Kong solicitors lack one of the most useful tools U.S. lawyers
have to protect themselves when representing corporations: Model Rule
1.13, which defines the corporate entity as the client, not the individual
officers and executives. 64 While the GPC admonishes the solicitor to be
wary of dual roles and conflicts of interest when sitting on boards of
directors for corporations,' 65 the GPC has no rule about an organization as a
client. This is a crucial shortcoming in the GPC. Solicitors may often have
a conflict of interest between the corporation they represent and the officers
or directors who secured their services. This conflict is heightened in cases
where the company is family-owned or closely-held, which is true for the
'6o See From the Council Table L supra note 22.
161 id.
162 id.
163 Joel Baglole, Risk Central: Hong Kong's Market Regulation Remains Lax, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,
2004, at CI [hereinafter Risk Central].
1 MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
165 GUIDELINES FOR PROF'L CONDUCT §7.01 (Conflict of Interest Between Solicitor and Client) cmt.
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majority of Hong Kong companies. 66  The lack of legal protections for
minority shareholders and the growing number of retail investors in Hong
Kong are also bringing this problem into sharp foCUS.
16 7
a. Solicitors Have a Conflict of Interest Between the Owners or Officers
and the Corporation for Hong Kong' Mainly Family-Owned or
Closely-Held Corporations
Like all Asian markets, Hong Kong has had ongoing problems with
corporate controls and governance due to the family-owned and closely-held
nature of many of its corporations.' 68 The resulting lenient internal controls
led to numerous mini-Enron collapses.' 69 The lack of controls also harmed
investor confidences in investing in Asia,170 which in turn negatively
effected Asian economies and slowed down the recovery from the recession
that began in 1997."' U.S. institutional investors are already turning down
opportunities in Asia due to the lack of corporate controls on family-owned
businesses. 72 Hong Kong is especially vulnerable to corruption because of
the opening of new markets in China, 73 the ownership and makeup of the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, ' 74 and the current state of corporate
governance regulations, remedies, and punishments. 75 Solicitors in Hong
Kong need a rule similar to Model Rule 1.13 to allow them to differentiate
between representing the corporation and representing the controlling family
members.
b. Hong Kong Has Minimal Protections for the Growing Numbers of
Minority Shareholders
Hong Kong's dearth of protections for the growing number of
minority shareholders compounds the problems that result from closely-held
166 See The Expropriation Game, supra note 23.
167 See Part III.C.2.b infra.
6' Chang Q. Sun, Capital Demands: A Warning for Asia's Family Companies, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 1, 2002, at A9.
169 Sara Webb, Enron Redux: Warning Signs May Signal the Next Collapse, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar.
7, 2002, at MI; The Expropriation Game, supra note 23, at 78-80.
170 Chang Q. Sun, supra note 168.
171 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Does Rule of Law Matter in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region?, in CHINA AND HONG KONG IN LEGAL TRANSITION, 91, 93 (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Patrick M.
Norton eds., 2000).
172 Id.
173 Loretta Ng & Ruby Chan, China-Related IPOs Meet Growing Demand-Record Offering for 2003
Puts Hong Kong at Center ofa Boom in New Issues, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at M2.
174 HONG KONG SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ABOUT HKEX, at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/exchange/asso/exchange.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
175 Risk Central, supra note 163.
JANUARY 2005
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
and family-owned corporations cheating retail investors and creating more
conflicts for solicitors. Both the Hong Kong Securities and Futures
Commission ("SFC") 176 and corporations are anxious to lure in a diverse
investment base, but, once shareholders buy their stock, the minority
shareholders have very limited rights. 177
When Hong Kong's typical family-owned corporations 178 need to gain
additional capital, the family takes the company "public" by floating twenty
five percent of the shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 179 This never
allows the investor shareholders to gain either a controlling interest or even
enough votes to place a member on the board, let alone affect major change
in relation to an expropriation, merger, or acquisition' 80 Investors who buy
shares in non-listed companies actually fare a bit better because they can fall
back on Companies Ordinance 168A,181 which allows shareholders recourse
to the courts if the company's o eration has been unfairly prejudicial to the
minority shareholder's interests. 82
Just prior to the transfer of Hong Kong sovereignty from Britain to
China, the SFC implemented an interim order regulating initial public offers
that effectively mandated the entry of a greater number of minority
shareholders into the market. 8 3 The goals of the interim order were to limit
purchases of the entire initial public offer by single individuals or entities, as
well as to diversify the investment base and to slow down the rate of initial
public offers. 184 The interim order stipulated that half of the shares of an
initial public offers must be reserved for investors who are investing less
than $5 million dollars. 185 This interim law is still in place and Hong Kong
continues to have a significant and growing number of minority investors.
While the number of minority shareholders is rising, they still lack the
right to privately sue in securities cases or to instigate class action
176 The SEC and the SFC hold analogous positions in the U.S. and Hong Kong markets.
177 The Expropriation Game, supra note 23.
78 See A. Majid, Low Chee Keong, & K. Arujnan, Company Directors' Perceptions of their
Responsibilities and Duties: A Hong Kong Survey, 28 H.K. L. J. 60 (1998).179 Companies Ordinance, § 42 (1997).
:80 The Expropriation Game, supra note 23.
III Companies Ordinance, § 168A (1997).
1I2 Id. See The Expropriation Game, supra note 23, at 87, for a discussion of what meager benefits
these expanded rights include.




186 Economist Intelligence Unit-Executive Briefing, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD. 310, Apr.
16, 2004.
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lawsuits.187 One of the main protections offered to U.S. minority
shareholders is the ability to initiate a lawsuit for private damages on behalf
of a shareholder, as well as filing class action lawsuits for all damaged
shareholders.1 88 This protection does not exist in the Hong Kong markets.
89
The Akai Holdings bankruptcy offers a perfect example of why this
distinction between investor protections is important.1 °  Hong Kong
shareholders and creditors are still without recourse for the hundreds of
millions of dollars that disappeared. Hong Kong creditors call the case
"Hong Kong's Enron."' 91 The Singer Sewing Machine Co., a U.S. company
that Akai purchased and revived, has safely emerged from bankruptcy court
as a going concern.' 92 The U.S. Singer Sewing Machine bondholders have
been able to file suit against Akai CEO James Ting, his former U.S.
accountants, and his former U.S. bankers in an attempt to recover their
losses. 193
Hong Kong's minority shareholders are further limited by unfair
company rules, such as the rules allowing hand votes at annual shareholder
meetings and by severe limitations on proxy voting. 194 David M. Webb,
retired Corporate Finance Director of BZW Asia Limited and member of the
Shareholders' Sub-committee of the SCCLR, 195 publishes a "Practitioner's
Guide to Listing Rules Loopholes," which informs minority shareholders of
the most popular ways in which family-owned Hong Kong corporations will
try to discount their votes.' 96 A current and long-standing practice is for
controlling directors to grant one or two shares to hundreds of employees
and require them to attend the annual meeting' 97 When votes come up, the
sea of employee hands voting the way their bosses required them to vote
overwhelms the legitimate minority shareholders' votes.
Mr. Webb also cautions against other common dishonest practices.
Some boards delay reporting of company news to extend the one-month
187 The Expropriation Game, supra note 23, at 93-97.
188 Id.
189 Securities and Futures Ordinance, § 22 (2003) (a corporate director's immunity from civil
lawsuits).
'9 See infra Part III.E.
191 Dishonored Dealmaker, supra note 7.
192 Id.
193 id.
194 Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Main Listing Board Rules 13.39.
'95 Mr. Webb's full credentials are available at http://www.webb-site.com/aboutus.htm#bio (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005).
'96 David M. Webb, The Practitioner's Guide to Listing Rules Loopholes, at http://www.webb-
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insider trading blackout to facilitate directors' insider-trading. 99 Another
trick is to set a five-day count-back for stock options pricing. This allows
directors to grant themselves options immediately after a major
announcement priced at the stock value five days prior to the
announcement. 20 0 Designating the controlling shareholder of a company as
a discretionary trust is yet another way directors get around the rules
prohibiting connected persons and interested parties from being involved in
any mergers or transactions. 20' The true size of the company or the stock
pool is rarely published, so minority investors may never know the true
202value of their holdings. Finally, as the company must only notify the SFC
and not the public regarding the resignation or firing of auditors or company
secretaries, the board may choose not to notify shareholders of major auditor
and accountant staff changes, key indicators of ongoing corporate fraud.20 3
c. The Incorporation of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the
Enforcement Strategy of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures
Commission Contribute to Solicitors' Woes
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange, unlike other traditional independent
exchanges, is a for-profit corporation that is listed on its own exchange.20 4
Hong Kong's listing rules are much more flexible and less restrained than
those of its U.S. and British counterparts, and Hong Kong investors do not
have the ability to seek class-action recourse from the courts. 205 Unlike the
SEC, the SFC does not investigate companies after public offerings to verify
the accuracy of the company's financials.2 °6 The SFC focuses on auditing
and reviews the filings provided by the company before they are issued to




202 "So after a placing has been announced, you will not know when it is completed. If it is a 'best
efforts' placing, you won't know how many shares are fimally issued. When employees exercise their share
options, you will not know. When shares are issued as deferred consideration under a previously announced
transaction, you won't know." David M. Webb, The Practitioner's Guide to Listing Rules Loopholes, at
http://www.webb-site.comiloopholes.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
203 id.
204 Id. Corporate information for investors in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange corporation is
available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/relation/relation.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
205 Risk Central, supra note 163.
206 Securities and Futures Commission ofHong Kong: Whom and How We Regulate, supra note 25.
207 Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, A Consultation Paper on the Securities and
Futures (Stock Market Listing) Rules and the Securities and Futures (Transfer of Functions - Stock
Exchange Company) Order (2002), available at
http://eapp01 .sfc.hk/apps/cf/stockmarketlistingrules.nsf/eng/Download/l/$FILE/stockmktlistingconsult
_eng.pdf(last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
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allows solicitors and companies to more easily offer inaccurate reports, and
drains resources from the prosecution and investigation offices. 20 8 Finally,
while the SFC can publicly sanction corporations and in extreme cases delist
them, it cannot instigate criminal proceedings against corporations or levy
sizable fines.209
3. SCCLR Phase I Did Not Solve the Problems and Phase II Does Not
Go Far Enough
The SCCLR recommendations will strengthen Hong Kong's markets,
but both reports could have presented much stronger solutions. Both phases
of the SCCLR reports are being used to diligently close loopholes in Hong
Kong's Companies Ordinance, Main Board Listing Rules, 210 and Securities
and Futures Ordinance, including eliminating a case-law-based virtual
indemnification of incompetent board members 21 and adding much needed
auditing and director controls. 212 The reports also helped with the much-
needed consolidation of the Securities and Futures Ordinance. 21 3 However,
neither Phase Report even mentions regulating solicitors, although solicitors
are involved in every aspect of the actions regulated by the affected
ordinances, listings on the main board, and major transactions.
One of the SCCLR Phase II Report's biggest victories for minority
shareholders was to allow proxy voting at the Annual General meetings,
214
though voting by a show of hands is still allowed215 which undercuts this
victory. The other Phase II victory was extending civil rights to shareholders
and the acknowledgement that Hong Kong should move toward allowing
class action derivative shareholder suits, though the SCCLR does not
208 The Expropriation Game, supra note 23.
209 Id.
210 The Main Board Listing Rules adopted many of the SCCLR Phase II recommendations on March
31, 2004. Memorandum from Richard Williams, Head of Listing, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, to
Subscribers, Update No. 80: Amendments to the Listing Rules Relating to Corporate Governance Issues,
Initial Listing Criteria and Continuing Listing Obligations (Mar. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.hkex.cormhlrule/mbrule/mbrpdate cover.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
211 See HK Director's Duty, supra note 159. Prior to the SCCLR Phase II Report a director was held
to the standard of the director's own experience and qualifications, or "an idiot was held to the standard of
being an idiot." Id. at 143. The SCCLR Phase II report increased this standard to include the skill and
diligence generally associated with the position and included a recommendation for tracking corporate
director training programs. PHASE II REPORT, supra note 18, §§ 3.1, 3.9.1.
212 See, generally HK Director's Duty, supra note 159.
213 Say H. Goo, Corporate Dimensions of the Securities and Futures Ordinance, 33 H.K. L. J. 271,
271 (2003).
214 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 18, §4.5.1, at xxi.
215 id.
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recommend the immediate adoption of this change.216 The SCCLR reports
are important steps to curing the deficiencies in the Hong Kong markets for
minority investors. As the SCCLR is, indeed, a standing committee, further
recommendations may make the Hong Kong markets even safer.
D. Case Study: BOTO
The impact of the lack of control over family owned or closely-held
corporations is highlighted by Boto, Inc.217 Boto sold off its successful
artificial Christmas tree and patio furniture division 218 to a company partially
owned by Boto CEO Michael Kao Cheung-Chong.219 The price of the sale
was a bargain for the purchasing company.2'0 This sale was made to fund
Boto's experimental computer graphics unit.22' As it turned out, the
computer graphics division was acquired to personally benefit another board
member.2  Another reason for the sale of the Christmas tree division was to
move a profitable division to a non-public company that solely benefited
223Boto's majority owners. Minority shareholders appealed to the SFC to
investigate or stop the sale.224 In an unprecedented move, Andrew Sheng,
Chairman of the SFC, released an open letter to investors.225  The letter
informed the investors that the Commission would not step in to protect their
investment and suggested that, if they were displeased with the way Boto
was being run, they should sell their stock.226 After the full details of the
Boto transactions came to light, Mr. Sheng retracted his earlier statement and
acknowledged that some regulatory intervention into questionable
transactions would have been appropriate.227
216 Id. at 106.
217 See Governance Offers Poor View, supra note 6.
218 Samuel Yeung, Santa Gift-Wraps Tree Maker, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 20, 2002, at Bus. 2.
219 Samuel Yeung, Boto Challenges Bans on Voting, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 9, 2002, at 3.
220 Samuel Yeung, Boto Pushes on with Controversial Sale, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 31, 2002,
at 2.
221 Id.
222 Samuel Yeung, Boto Failed to Disclose Connected Transactions, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
19, 2002, at 2.
223 The Expropriation Game, supra note 23, at 80-81.
224 Enoch Yiu, SFC Rejects Intervention Role in Firms: In Spite of Complaints, Sheng Puts Onus on
Investors, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 14, 2002, at 1.
225 Id.; Samuel Yeung, HKEx Replies on Boto Vote Give Rise to More Questions, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 30, 2002, at Bus. 12.
226 Yiu, supra note 224; Yeung, supra note 225.
227 Samuel Yeung, Securities Watchdog Chief Says Middle Ground Exists in Role of Regulators on
Management Issues: Sheng Changes Governance Tone, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 24, 2002, at 3;
Samuel Yeung, Boto Sale Ignores Advice, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 20, 2002, at Bus. 1.
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E. Case Study: Akai Industries
Akai Holdings Ltd. demonstrates Hong Kong's problems with internal
controls on closely-held corporations and the shareholder's lack of civil
recourse. 221 In 1982, Akai CEO James Ting started with a small electronics
firm and built it into a multi-national empire by buying well-known brands
that were in financial trouble and reinvigorating them.22 9 Akai Holdings
revived stocks as diverse as Singer (sewing machines), Sansui (electronics),
and Hang Ten (fashion). 230 At its peak it sold $ 1.4 billion in merchandise
Ha-TnA3t pa tsl 232
per year. 2 1 Akai held more than $2 billion in assets. In January 1999, the
company had $262 million in cash and $1 billion in shareholder equity.233 In
the summer of 2000, Mr. Ting transferred management control to a holding
company, liquidated many personal and corporate assets without stockholder
approval, and disappeared, probably into mainland China. 234 The resulting
investigation uncovered a corporation with few internal controls on
spending, allowing Mr. Ting to use corporate accounts as his personal petty
cash. 235 Non-existent assets, which were used to secure hundreds of millions
of dollars in debts, were shuffled and lost through various accounts in
countries such as the British Virgin Islands, Liberia, and Jordan. 36 Investors
in Hong Kong are still waiting for a criminal prosecution, which will be
worthless when it happens because no one can find Ting.237 While Hong
Kong investors have no real recourse, bondholders in the United States are
able to attach Akai's U.S. assets and will probably be made whole again.
238
IV. THE UNITED STATES AND HONG KONG EACH HAVE PART OF A
SOLUTION FOR EFFECTIVE USE OF LAWYERS TO Am IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM
Both the U.S. and Hong Kong systems have strong and weak points,
in nearly mirrored opposition. The two countries should learn from each
other. The SEC should negotiate more with the state bar associations, not
just to relieve the tensions and stave off the inevitable lawsuits, but to come
228 Jane Moir, Corpse Stripped to Bones, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 20, 2001, at 1.
229 id.
230 id.
231 Dishonored Dealmaker, supra note 7.
232 id.
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up with a clear definition of a lawyer's duties when representing a listed
corporation. Hong Kong needs to step up the tenor and timing of its
enforcement practices for both securities violations by companies and for
solicitors violating the MOU. Hong Kong also needs to clearly differentiate
the corporate entity as the client, so lawyers will be able to help public
companies resist the tactics of majority controlling shareholders.
A. In the United States, the SEC Should Negotiate with Bar Associations
and Companies to Ease Tensions and Increase Clarity of a Lawyer'
Duties
Hong Kong's approach of negotiation and clarification would help the
current situation in the United States. The SEC should be more willing to
negotiate with bar associations and companies. If the SEC wants companies
to cooperate, it should back down from demanding cooperation,
skyrocketing penalties, and its aggressive prosecution stance. While on the
one hand the SEC lauds cooperation by firms such as HomeStore, it should
realize that the rising penalties and strong-arm enforcement methods will
discourage companies, auditors, officers, and attorneys from cooperating in
all but the most extreme criminal cases.
The ongoing battles between the state bar associations as well as the
SEC's firm take-no-prisoners stance on what is a contentious federalism
issue only worsens the confusion about and resistance to the new rules. U.S.
lawyers should consider the benefits of a negotiated compliance, such as the
MOU. While there has not been a case under the MOU, its preeminence in
the rules of conduct would put lawyers on notice of their duties both to the
integrity of the market and to the ethical standards of the Law Society.
The SEC negotiating with the state bar associations would not only
reduce tension, but also result in a clear definition of the lawyer's duties to
the client, the state rules, and the SEC. This clarity would allow lawyers to
better represent their clients and to protect themselves from malpractice
lawsuits, ethics complaints, and SEC sanctions.
The MOU may have helped in the Enron case, both to discover and
curb the fraud earlier and to give the SEC another avenue to increase the
victim's fund239 by allowing the SEC to pursue the lawyers. Enron involved
breaches of accounting standards and corporate governance controls.240 The
239 Another feature of Sarbanes-Oxley is that SEC penalties and disgorgements no longer go to the
United States Treasury; they go to a "Fair Fund" to be used to rectify and mitigate victim's damages. 17
CFR J§ 201.1100-1106.
4 Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 HouS. L. REV. 99, 111 (2003);
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1299 (2002).
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lawyers may not have knowingly or recklessly participated in the violations,
but discovered afterwards that their services were used in furtherance of
perpetrating frauds on the market.241 Because the MOU does not allow for
this hindsight correction, the SEC should maintain the reflective portions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley-derived regulations.
B. Hong Kong Should Scale Up Enforcements and Clarify the
Relationship Between the Solicitor and the Corporation
Hong Kong needs to increase the tenor and timing of enforcement of
its securities regulations. For solicitors, the laws are in place and just need
to be used. The threat of a noisy withdrawal is also needed to give the
solicitor power in negotiating with the client. The Hong Kong Law Society
should consider adopting a new GPC similar to Model Rule 1.13
(Organization as a Client). This allows lawyers to represent the listed
corporation, not the majority owners.
There are three levels of enforcement involved, all of which need to
be strengthened or pursued more aggressively by regulators in Hong Kong.
First of all, on the client-level, the solicitor should be able to noisily
withdraw. This process would give the solicitors the power to keep a
company's directors and owners honest while giving early warning to
investors to do their own research into the company. In the Akai bankruptcy,
a lawyer responsible for moving assets would possibly have seen well in
advance of the bankruptcy that the emperor had no clothes-there were no
assets supporting the financing arrangements. A noisy withdrawal could
have alerted the authorities before the money, and Mr. Ting, vanished.
In the TV Azteca case, the most Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
would have been able to do under the GPC, even including the MOU, was
silently withdraw, choosing to neither knowingly nor recklessly participate
in a Hong Kong Stock Exchange violation. There is no affirmative duty to
inform the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, nor a process to inform the
exchange, aside from telling the truth in a tribunal.242 Neither the investors
nor the corporation would have been protected from the fraudulent self-
interested actions of the TV Azteca CEO. A less scrupulous or less thorough
firm would not be prevented from completing the transaction. The
regulatory agency would have no idea of the fraud taking place. The
241 Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done. The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 1236, 1239 (2003).
242 See MOU, supra note 15.
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corporation's alleged violations would continue; and the shareholders would
still be damaged.
The second enforcement level needing improvement is the Law
Society. It is doubtful that during the years the MOU has been in place not a
single violation of its provisions has occurred, yet the MOU has never been
used in a single prosecution. The Law Society needs to more aggressively
pursue these violations. When solicitors see that their ability to practice is
on the line, they may be more inspired to stand up to corporate officers.
The final level of enforcement improvement is at the SFC and Hong
Kong Stock Exchange. These organizations should switch their focus from
pre-release auditing to verifying posted corporate information. Regardless
of whether the switch is made, the SFC needs to take the new
recommendations of the SCCLR and actively pursue violators. As seen in
the HomeStore case, fear can work.243 If, like HomeStore, the errant
company knows that the regulatory agency will come down swiftly and
severely on any infraction, then companies, as HomeStore did, will strive to
remain in compliance with regulations.244
The MOU also contains no differentiation between the duty to the
organization as a client, as opposed to the directors and officers. Again, this
is a key to protecting Hong Kong companies from their majority owners.
While the MOU is an impressive and far-sighted agreement, it still does not
protect minority shareholders from the tyranny of the majority owners.
Hong Kong Law Society should consider adopting Model Rule 1.13 (The
Organization as a Client). 245 Adopting Model Rule 1.13 may have helped in
the Boto case. A solicitor acting under a rule similar to Model Rule 1.13
may have raised red flags to the board and to the authorities about the CEO
selling off the corporation's most successful division for well below market
value in order to give more funding to a non-profitable division that was
purchased from another interested board member. Here, as the highest
officers were involved, reporting up would have been futile, but reporting
out options would still be available to the solicitor.
C. Hong Kong Should Make These Changes Slowly to Remain
Competitive with Chinese Markets
Adopting similar regulations to Sarbanes-Oxley may prevent Hong
Kong from continuing to open up Chinese markets and giving investors
243 See comments by Sandra J. Harris, supra note 99.
244 id.
245 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
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access to Chinese corporations. The strict auditing and outside board
member requirements may deter corporations from listing in Hong Kong,
sending the new corporations to lesser-regulated markets, such as Shanghai.
Competition among East Asian markets is intense, but the East Asian
market that Hong Kong should be most worried about, however, is mainland
China. China and Chinese corporations are becoming savvier in the world
markets, with or without the "gateway" the Chinese Central Government
envisions Hong Kong providing. 46 The Initial Public Offering ("IPO") for
China Telecom, 247 a previously government-owned utility, listed on both the
Hong Kong and U.S. stock exchanges.248 China Telecom is only the first of
many state-owned companies being offered, 249 as investors looking to get
into mainland China markets consider buying large state-run Chinese IPOs a
safe option.250 These mainland Chinese corporations can access "the huge
pool of domestic savings by selling renminbi-shares, ' 251 while companies
incorporated in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must get
permission to raise capital in mainland China.252 China maintains greater
control over companies operating in the mainland than in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, and therefore taxes the mainland and Hong
Kong corporations differently to encourage mainland investment.253 China's
internal banks are preparing to sell shares of stock.254 Mainland China is
also actively pursuing corporate governance reforms in order to compete in
attracting international investors. 5 Not only is Shanghai competing with
Hong Kong to become the entryway to Chinese markets, but questionable
246 Dellapenna, supra note 171, at 93.
247 Robert Bailhache, SEC is Expected to Clear China Telecom's Initial Public Offering, KNIGHT
RIDDER TRIBUNE BUS. NEWS, Sept. 22, 2002.
248 Craig Karmin, Best Route to China May Be Indirect One: Many Turn to Asian Stocks With
Mainland Exposure As Way to Invest in Economy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at C1. China Telecom
recently announced a future second offering of shares. Loretta Ng, China Telecom Plans to Offer New
Shares-Move Would Help Finance Acquisition of 10 Networks; Net Profit Climbs Sharply, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Mar. 18, 2004, at A3.
249 Matt Pottinger, IPO Shows China Is Bent on Selling State Enterprises, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2002,
at A17.
250 Craig Karmin, China's Huge Market Is a Tricky Play for Investors-Many Turn to Asian Stocks
With Mainland Exposure To Tap Surging Economy, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 10, 2003, at M.
251 Id. Renninbi is the Chinese currency. Renminbi, or RMB, means "People's Currency."
CHINATOUR.COM, CHINESE CURRENCY-RENMINBI, http://www.chinatoday.com/fin/mon/ (last visited Jan.
14, 2005).
252 See Karmin, supra note 250; Dellapenna, supra note 171, at 93.
253 See Andrew Halkyard, One Country, Two (Taxation) Systems, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 73
(2000).
254 Keith Bradsher, China Announces New Bailout of Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at c.I.
255 Richard Daniel Ewing, Corporate Governance Can Drive China's Reforms, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 22, 2002, at A9.
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Chinese companies are already using Hong Kong's international reputation
and listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, only to be sanctioned later.256
Hong Kong, therefore, needs to take slow steps toward regulation.
Moving to a fully-regulated system quickly may hinder its competitiveness
vis-A-vis other Asian markets, even while improving accountability to
minority and international shareholders.
V. CONCLUSION
Lawyers and solicitors are in a unique position to detect and prevent
corporate fraud. Both the U.S. and the Hong Kong systems appreciate this,
but the two systems approach controlling lawyers and solicitors very
differently. The United States strong-arms lawyers to comply with
disclosure rules; Hong Kong negotiated a clear agreement between two
enforcement entities. Both systems need to be strengthened in order to
assure compliance, however, or both systems will continue to rely on the
fallible adherence to the rules by lawyers and solicitors.
Lawyers and solicitors also must protect their client's secrets. This is
inherent to any legal practice and should be respected, if not revered. Any
disclosure of information should be highly selective, both in what is
disclosed and to whom it is disclosed. However, to protect third party
interests, this escape valve must be allowed. When the client has abused the
attorney-client privilege and used the lawyer or solicitor to commit fraud,
the lawyer or solicitor should be able to protect herself and her professional
reputation and withdraw from representation in a way that most benefits
their true client, the corporation.
As long as officers' and executives' jobs are on the line, or as long as
owners of public corporations control the boards, there will always be a
temptation to act fraudulently. When officers, executives, and directors fail
to resist the temptation, the only remaining protections for investors are the
lawyers. Senator Edwards said, "The truth is that executives and
accountants do not work alone. Anybody who works in corporate America
knows that whenever you see corporate executives and accountants working,
lawyers are virtually always there looking over their shoulder., 257 Senator
Jon Corzine, a former corporate lawyer, said, "We cannot overlook the role
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Focusing on lawyers is an appropriate way to prevent corporate fraud.
Setting up a framework where lawyers and solicitors have a clear
understanding of who their client is, what their duties to their client are,
which rules of professional conduct apply, and a certainty of enforcement of
these rules will strengthen any financial market. Hong Kong has half the
necessary pieces. The United States has the other half. By learning from
each other, they could both build effective markets of the highest integrity,
which would be a safe haven for investors, corporations, and legal
professionals.

